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SECURITY INFORMATION

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 January 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR:

Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Jack E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2B)
Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)

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SUBJECT : Post Mortem on NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58

1. Pursuant to the meeting of the IAC representatives on 16 December 1952, and the working level discussions held with individual agencies subsequent thereto, we propose to release the attached documents.

2. If you do not agree to the present text, please call me before noon Tuesday, 27 January. (Code 143, Ext. 563)

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D/Asst. Director/Am.

Distribution "B"

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

22 January 1953

DRAFT MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE
COORDINATION

SUBJECT : Post-Mortem on NIE-47, "Communist Capabilities and Intentions in Asia", NIE-55/1, "Communist Capabilities and Probable Courses of Action in Korea", and NIE-58, "Relations Between the Chinese Communist Regime and the USSR: Their Present Character and Probable Future Courses".

REFERENCE: Procedure for Reducing Intelligence Deficiencies in NIE's, dated 3 June 1952.

ENCLOSURE: A. List of Intelligence Deficiencies Revealed in the Preparation of NIE's 47, 55/1 and 58.

1. On 16 December 1952, the IAC representatives held a post-mortem meeting on NIE's 47, 55/1, and 58.

2. The IAC representatives noted that:

a. Steps taken by the IAC agencies as a result of the post-mortem on SE-27 ("Probable Effects of Various Possible Courses of Action with Respect to Communist China", dated 5 June 1952) are beginning to result in better coverage of economic questions.

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b. Many of the deficiencies encountered in the preparation of NIE-47, NIE-55/1, and NIE-58 are obvious weaknesses which the IAC agencies are currently trying to correct. In other cases the gaps may well be "unknowable".

g. Nevertheless, a further study of the intelligence weaknesses in these estimates may assist the efforts made by collection and research activities coping with these and related problems.

3. The IAC representatives have agreed on a list of the more important current deficiencies in our intelligence (Enclosure A).

4. Recommendation

That the collection agencies of the intelligence community review their priorities in the light of the findings of the IAC representatives as set forth in Enclosure A.


D/Asst. Director/Adm.

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